MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dulles

This is to remind that you wanted to bring this up at the morning meeting on Monday, May 16.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Remarks: I think the Director would be interested in the attached press release from Senator Jackson's Subcommittee on Policy Machinery announcing hearings this month on "the problem of recruiting the country's 'best brains' for government service in the total competition of the cold war". The released transcript of Dr. James A. Perkins' executive session testimony is also attached. I have marked some of the more important parts of his testimony.

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Assistant Legislative Counsel

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UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET



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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1955—O-342531

From the Office of
Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.)
Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on
National Policy Machinery
CApitol 4-3121, Ext. 3481

For release A.M.'s
Sat., May 7, 1960

JUN 4 1960

Morning meeting folder

Senator Henry M. Jackson, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, today announced that the Subcommittee will hear six distinguished authorities next week on the problem of recruiting the country's "best brains" for government service in the total competition of the cold war.

Jackson said: "Better national policies can only come from better men in government. Human talent is our most precious asset--but our government has failed to make full use of it. Today we are like a baseball team with .400 hitters on the bench. We must get all our good players off the bench and into the game."

The hearings, scheduled for the mornings of May 11, 12 and 13, will focus upon the causes and possible cures of the government's long-standing difficulties in recruiting and retaining top policy-makers for key positions in the national security field, including the State and Defense Departments.

The schedule of hearings is as follows:

Wednesday, May 11: Harold Boeschenstein, president of the Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation; member, Business Advisory Council, Department of Commerce; served as chairman of Special Committee on World Economic Practices (Boeschenstein Committee); former vice-chairman, War Production Board.

Roger W. Jones, Chairman, United States Civil Service Commission; former deputy director, Bureau of the Budget; one of first recipients of the "President's Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service."

More

Thursday, May 12: Marion B. Folsom, Director, Eastman Kodak Company; former Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare; former Under Secretary of the Treasury.

Crawford H. Greenewalt, President, E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company; member, Business Advisory Council, Department of Commerce; member, President Eisenhower's Commission on National Goals.

Friday, May 13: John J. Corson, management consultant, McKinsey and Company; member, Gaither Committee; formerly director, U. S. Employment Service, director, Bureau of Old Age and Survivor Insurance, and deputy director general, UNRRA.

Roswell B. Perkins, attorney; chairman of Special Committee on Conflict of Interest Laws of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York; former Assistant Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.

All hearings will start at 10:00 a.m. in the Government Operations Committee hearing room (3302 New Senate Office Building).

The Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery was established last year for the purpose of making the first full review of the national security process since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. Further hearings will be scheduled throughout the session.

Serving with Jackson on the Subcommittee are Senators Hubert H. Humphrey (D., Minn.), Edmund S. Muskie (D., Me.), Karl E. Mundt (R., S. Dak.), and Jacob K. Javits (R., N. Y.).

From the Office of Sen. Henry M. Jackson,
(D., Wash.), Chairman, Senate Subcommittee
on National Policy Machinery
CApitol 4-3121, Ext. 3481

For release: A.M.'s
Monday, May 9, 1960

# NOTE TO PRESS

Attached is the transcript of executive session testimony by Dr. James A. Perkins, Vice President of the Carnegie Corporation and member of the Gaither Committee, who appeared before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery on April 25, 1960.

Because this portion of Mr. Perkins' testimony related to the National Security Council, it was taken in executive session in accordance with the "guidelines" agreed to by Senator Jackson and President Eisenhower last July. Those guidelines state that: "Any testimony by present or former government officials who have served on the National Security Council or its subordinate bodies regarding the National Security Council and its subordinate machinery will be taken first in executive session."

This testimony has been cleared for release in accordance with the procedures set forth in the guidelines.

Senator Jackson introduced Dr. Perkins at the open session of the Subcommittee on April 25 as follows:

"We are deeply privileged to have with us today Dr. James A. Perkins, Vice President of the Carnegie Corporation, and Vice President of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. In these posts, he has played an important role in promoting more effective research and teaching in the natural and social sciences.

"Dr. Perkins speaks to us with an impressive background of experience in the relation of science and technology to national security. He was formerly deputy chairman of the Research and Development Board of the Department of Defense. He is a trustee of the Institute for Defense Analyses and Chairman of the Study Group on Strategy and Foreign Policy of the Council on Foreign Relations.

"As I have indicated, he also served as a member of the Gaither Committee, appointed by President Eisenhower in 1957 to survey national security problems."

*******

EXECUTIVE SESSION

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND THE POLICY PROCESS

Witness: Dr. James A. Perkins, Vice President, Carnegie Corporation, New York, N. Y.; Member, Gaither Committee

Monday, April 25, 1960

United States Senate
Subcommittee on National
Policy Machinery of the
Government Operations
Committee
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 12:35 p.m., pursuant to call, in room 3302 of the Senate Office Building, Hon. Henry M. Jackson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senator Jackson (presiding).

Staff Members Present: J. K. Mansfield, staff director; Dorothy Fosdick and Grenville Garside, professional staff members; and Edmund E. Pendleton, minority counsel.

Also Present: Charles A. Haskins, senior staff member, National Security Council; Robert Berry, representing Senator Karl E. Mundt; and Walter L. Reynolds, chief clerk and staff director of the Committee on Government Operations.

Senator Jackson. The subcommittee will be in order.

The subcommittee will now resume in accordance with the procedures worked out by the chairman of this subcommittee and the White House. We are meeting in executive session.

You understood from the directive that you received from me by letter what the guide lines are, Dr. Perkins?

Dr. Perkins. Indeed I did, Senator, and I also received very specific instructions on this score from members of your staff, who want to make sure I understand them.

Senator Jackson. Did anyone else speak to you about this?

Dr. Perkins. Yes, sir, a Mr. Haskins, the gentleman who is here, whom I just met this morning, a senior staff member of the National Security Council, called me on the phone and he asked me

if I had seen the guide lines. Do you want me to repeat the conversation?

Senator Jackson. Will you relate the conversation as best you can?

Dr. Perkins. Well, my recollection of the conversation runs about like this: He called me to ask if I had seen the guide lines, and I said I had. He then reminded me, which I knew, that my appearance before the National Security Council in connection with the Gaither Committee did not necessarily qualify me as an expert witness on NSC affairs and I was only too happy to agree with him.

He wanted to assure me that the matter here was a matter of considerable sensitivity, that he wanted to make sure that I realized that questions were likely to be asked that would seem to suggest that the only proper answer was one that would be enormously critical.

I read him a list of questions that I had received in a letter from you, and he suggested that the question of relations between Defense and State Department suggested the absence of adequate coordination.

I told him that I thought that honest men could differ as to whether or not it was adequate or not. When I told him that I would be speaking as a private citizen he agreed with me that I should speak my mind as I saw it as long as I was fully conversant with the security factors involved.

I had the general impression that Mr. Haskins certainly wanted to make sure that I realized that I was speaking in a sensitive area, and that the National Security Council and its operations were sensitive matters and that he and his colleagues in the Security Council were concerned that I be objective and discreet in the handling of any questions.

I think that would be a fair and honest account of that conversation.

Senator Jackson. And you previously advised him, however, that the chairman of this committee and the staff, as well, had made it clear to you by submitting the exchange of letters between myself and the President, and also the so-called guide lines, and so you had all of that information.

Dr. Perkins. I did indeed, but he was good enough to send me additional copies of the guide lines, which I received in the mail a couple of days ago. I quite independently received another set of the guide lines from Dr. David Beckler. In what capacity he was sending

them to me I am not clear, but I think that he is executive officer of the President's Science Advisory Committee.

So I am well equipped with guide lines, Senator, and if I do anything wrong it is not because of a lack of attention from both the administrative side and the legislative side.

Senator Jackson. With that, I presume that you are fully informed as to the rules.

Dr. Perkins. I hope so, and it is no one's fault in this room if I do not answer correctly.

Senator Jackson. Now, I would like to ask you a few questions in connection with the National Security Council.

I wonder if you could indicate your opinion, Dr. Perkins, as to the effectiveness of the National Security Council as an advisory mechanism to the President, in general?

Dr. Perkins. My answer will be in general, because that is the way you have posed it.

I would say that it has been at its best when it has to do with matters that come within fairly well established guide lines, both in terms of budget and in terms of established orientation, and it has been at its weakest when matters that are extremely controversial and break into new ground or that require major revisions of policy.

Let me elaborate on that if I may, Senator, but I will proceed any way you wish.

Senator Jackson. Proceed in your own way.

Dr. Perkins. That would be my specific answer. I think the reason why this is so is that the Security Council, after all, is made up of both statutory and invited members who are the heads of operating agencies. They are brought together to make sure that work in the different departments is coordinated and, of course, as we all know, the Security Council itself was created in response to some badly felt needs for coordination during World War II.

It was a need for more standard and routine coordination of activities, at the top side of both State and Defense, and at that time State, War and Navy, the so-called SWNCC Committee.

When you get a committee of operators they have enormous ongoing programs and responsibilities, both in Defense, State, and

elsewhere, and they find it very difficult to deal with large innovations of policy or program.

It is the inherent, built-in danger of any committee: it will operate most effectively when basic policy is firmly established. It will not operate effectively to establish new policy.

I think if I were to make a general judgment about the NSC, it is that the President has not received from the normal NSC routine the kind of sharp debate, the clear differences of opinion, the new ideas that would require major modifications of program. However, I think that he has been well served by a group that has stabilized operations, and stabilized it by seeing to it that all parts of the government are drawn into the process of policy planning.

Now, this is again a case where you are talking or we are talking about styles of administration, if you will. I think my concern about this would be that currently, as one looks at our national security policy, I am impressed with the need for some fairly major re-thinking of some of our lines of policy.

I am afraid that this system, and it has nothing to do with the people in it, is not likely to permit new or substantially new ideas to filter their way up uncompromised and vividly expressed.

In short, it has served the process of interagency agreement well. It has not served the job of creating new policy lines, and for anyone to expect that it would, would seem to me to be an error in organizational judgment.

I am told, and there is some evidence both in print and elsewhere from people who have been in it and out of it, that the President is not getting the fresh point of view through this system which, in my judgment, the rapidly evolving cycle that I described in open hearing would require.

Senator Jackson. Did you have a chance to read Mr. Lovett's testimony?

Dr. Perkins. Indeed I did; yes, sir.

Senator Jackson. In general, do you agree with the pertinent points that he made?

Dr. Perkins. Indeed I do.

Senator Jackson. He made specific reference to the growing size of the NSC, that is, the broadening composition of it and the rather

large meetings. Do you have any comment on that?

Dr. Perkins. Yes, I do.

Senator Jackson. Will you proceed?

Dr. Perkins. I am told they do vary in size. I am not quite sure what a standard-sized meeting is but from reading the piece by Robert Cutler and Gordon Gray who were in print on this subject, it sounds to me as if a standard meeting must be around 19 or 20 people.

There are meetings where much larger numbers than that are invited, and I am also told there are some meetings where smaller numbers are used, but I would gather that maybe 20 has been about an average.

I would have to go back to the point I just made, Senator, that if you view this as a system of validating policies already agreed upon or minor changes therein, there is a pretty good case for increasing the number of people who sit in on those meetings, who then will come away learning what policy is, and by their presence, presumably taking some responsibility for its execution.

So I think that the more one uses the NSC as a system of interagency coordination and the legitimatizing of decisions already arrived at, the growth in numbers is inevitable, because people left out of it and not at the meetings whose concurrence is required have a prima facie case for attending.

But if we are talking about a body that is going to advise the President, as Mr. Lovett suggested in his testimony, and in a free and open way discuss substantial changes in policy, then I think the larger the number the less effective it is likely to be. In a room full of 20 or 30 people, and sometimes more, many ideas are going to be held back.

Senator Jackson. In this connection I quote from the previous testimony of Mr. Lovett on February 23, including my question to him:

> "Senator Jackson. Now to turn to this question of the jurisdiction of the NSC: Do you think that it should confine itself to a few important issues as opposed to having a lot of issues brought in?
>
> "Mr. Lovett. Yes, sir; I do; I think the fewer the better."

Dr. Perkins. I agree, but I think my answer turns on the point I just made. If you are talking about the need of a system for

acquiring government concurrence, then I think that you will bring up more issues.

If you are thinking of a very top-level group of the President's most intimate advisers and those dealing operationally with the most vital parts of national security policy, then I think that you reduce the number of topics.

Senator Jackson. If I may summarize this general area that we have been covering here in the colloquy, I take it that you feel that the size of the body should be limited in the NSC, and that the issues should be limited to the critical or crucial ones; and lastly, that these critical and crucial issues should be thoroughly discussed and debated with the sharp alternatives presented that naturally follow from that kind of discussion, so that the President can make a decision based on those sharp issues and alternatives.

Dr. Perkins. I agree with that.

Senator Jackson. In this way, he discharges fully and completely his constitutional responsibilities, does he not?

Dr. Perkins. Yes. I want to make awfully sure I am understood about this, Senator, because it is a very delicate and central point in the topside management of the government.

You started out your question by asking "Does this serve well in its advisory function to the President?" If one follows that line, one talks about a small group dealing with large subjects, and relatively few of them, in an atmosphere where there is the widest possible debate made possible, and where the issues are sharpened, and where there is an actual premium put on people coming in and vigorously presenting fresh points of view.

It has been used largely for a second, and in my judgment, somewhat contradictory purpose. It has been used as a system of legitimatizing decisions already arrived at throughout the complex structure of the executive branch.

On that line, you invite more people, and you have more papers, and you have larger numbers of questions. But to the extent that you mix these two functions up, you cannot get good advice from an organization that has been asked to do Function No. 2. Nor do you get good implementation, obviously, from a relatively small number who are set up for the advisory purpose.

Do I make myself clear?

Senator Jackson. I understand fully, and in your comments you are approaching the NSC from the point of philosophy that the body might be better treated as an advisory body to the President.

Dr. Perkins. That is correct.

Senator Jackson. In order that he can better fulfill his constitutional responsibilities.

Dr. Perkins. Precisely.

Senator Jackson. Obviously, if the President is to use such a body, it must, under the Constitution, be limited to an advisory purpose. The secondary purpose that you mentioned is an entirely different one, and a body to serve that purpose is not an advisory body to the President of the United States.

Dr. Perkins. I would take it that any student of administration would concur that one of the dangers of an advisory committee is that the person who uses it for advisory purposes can very easily permit that advisory body to turn operational.

This is not just the NSC, but this is applied to General Motors or Harvard University, or any large organization you want to mention. Once the thing turns operational, then the structure slowly changes, and the procedure slowly changes, and the man who originally sets it up begins to withdraw himself from the operation, and permits the machinery itself to settle problems that heretofore he resolved.

Senator Jackson. Now, I have one last question, Dr. Perkins.

I should like to refer you to our Senate committee print entitled "Organizing for National Security: Selected Materials," and to the article by Mr. Robert R. Bowie called "Analysis of our Policy Machine." Mr. Bowie, I believe, is currently the director of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University.

He was the director of the State Department's policy planning staff from 1953 to 1957, and in that capacity he served as Assistant Secretary of State.

Have you had an opportunity to read the article?

Dr. Perkins. Yes, I have. I have had plenty of occasions to talk with Robert Bowie about this, too.

Senator Jackson. That is over a period of years?

Dr. Perkins. I have known him a good many years, ever since we were in a command car in Germany together, Senator.

Senator Jackson. On pages 105 and 106 Mr. Bowie makes four points. I wonder if the points that he makes there, Dr. Perkins, might be applicable in your judgment to the operation of the National Security Council?

Mr. Pendleton. Let's go over them, and apply them one by one.

Senator Jackson. Suppose that I just read the points. I think that that might be easier. Mr. Bowie writes as follows:

"In appraising our foreign policy machinery, one can well recall how little time our Nation has had to master its current role. We emerged from World War II with ill-defined or mistaken notions about our position and our interests, and the threats to them, and about the direction of foreign policy.

"Most great powers have had an extended period to develop understanding and techniques of foreign affairs and the framework of policy. Our Nation has had little more than a decade, in times of unprecedented change and turmoil. In evolving its policy and its relations with others it has learned from experience at a rapid rate. In these terms we can be proud of a notable achievement.

"We cannot, however, rest on those laurels. History awards no prizes for effort, no matter how creditable, if the results are not adequate to the need. We must, therefore, ask ourselves whether our present procedures are equal to our task. Judged by this criterion, our machinery suffers from several weaknesses.

"(1) It is obviously ponderous. In running the gamut of the Federal bureaucracy, Congress and its committees and our allies, an analysis or proposal is likely to be much watered down or blurred by compromise. Moreover, the time and energy required by the process doubtless create strong inertia against initiating new policies or actions or changing existing positions.

"In a recent press conference, Secretary Dulles, in explaining why no change was then planned in Western disarmament proposals, said:

> "'It was not easy to arrive at the present disarmament proposals, representing an agreement, as they did, among 15 countries. Many of these countries had different viewpoints, different interests, and different concerns. It was a task of very great difficulty to bring about agreement,

and that agreement is a delicate and fragile one.

"'There are aspects of those proposals that were not very happily received by some that went along in the interests of achieving unanimity. Now, to break that unanimity and try to find new unanimity or new proposals without any knowledge in advance as to whether that would be acceptable or not to the Soviet Union would seem to me to be a futile and indeed reckless effort to make.'

"One need not take issue with this specific decision to realize that the same factors may inhibit revision of policies when conditions change."

What is your reaction to that?

Dr. Perkins. I would like to associate myself with Robert Bowie on this point. He is covering a variety of matters other than the Security Council, since this comment is addressed to the whole of the Federal bureaucracy, Congress, and his committees, and allies. But since obviously he is including all, he is including the part, and one of them he obviously must have meant was the Security Council.

One does have a feeling that the procedure here is ponderous, and as I think I mentioned earlier, there does seem to be a strong inertia against initiating new policies through this procedure. I think it is because of this inherent contradiction in using the same group for advisory purposes and for operational coordination.

I think if they could get these two functions untangled and leave the NSC to where it was supposed to be in the beginning, as a group who would coordinate their advice to the President in his presence, and sharpen up issues, the ponderousness, if there is such a word, would decrease.

So I think Bowie, who must know, and he was in the middle of this, as director of the policy planning staff in the State Department, has a point.

Senator Jackson. Mr. Bowie's second point is this:

"(2) The machinery has not always assured a realistic appraisal of conditions which run counter to strong preconceptions. The tendency of some to discount persuasive evidence of Soviet economic progress and Soviet ability to produce complex weapons probably resulted in part from reluctance to believe a system so repugnant in its methods could succeed as well as it has. Again, the full

sweep of the Soviet threat has been hard for some to grasp because its purposes and methods are so foreign to our own experience. Similarly, seeing the world through the eyes of others with utterly different history, values, and position, is especially hard. Yet failure to do so leads inevitably to misjudging reactions in areas like the Middle East."

Dr. Perkins. I think this is a very important point and it would be pretty hard to separate human nature, Senator, from the NSC itself. Both are involved here.

Let me refer, if I may, and I am free to do so, to the atmosphere that we all discovered when we came down in June or July of 1957, with the Gaither Committee. There it seemed to us quite clear that the nature of the threat was not fully realized, or at least the threat as we discovered it on briefings from the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Pendleton. May I interrupt here? If these are planned to be released, I think the Gaither Committee report still has not been released by the President. This would probably have to be deleted.

Senator Jackson. That is right, but he is just stating his personal judgment. The fact that any matter is taken up in executive session does not make it automatically releasable. It is in accordance with the guide lines and that is why we are in executive session.

Dr. Perkins. I had no intention of even talking about what was in the Gaither Committee report. I am saying, however, that when we first came down, it seemed to us that the nature of the threat was not fully determined or fully considered. I think that is eminently clear from the country's reaction once Sputnik went up.

As a matter of fact, I said then and I say again that whatever words of wisdom we may have put into that document would have largely been wasted if the Russians had not so fully cooperated by sending up a missile one week before we submitted our report, or a satellite, and another one some weeks afterwards. We were well bracketed.

But the point needs to be made that the existing machinery did not seem to bring to the surface in the right way the changed circumstances of the Russian threat to American systems.

Some pieces of this puzzle were known, but you know you can know the parts, but they do not have the full impact on you if you do not pray over them and look at them in a fresh way.

People who are operating enormously large and responsible jobs find it very difficult to re-think their premise every Tuesday. You cannot change your mind about basic things too often or the machinery

you are running breaks down.

But I would say in the balance here between the system that sees to it that you operate with some degree of stability on the one hand, and a system that sees to it that the major premises are re-examined in the light of new facts, there is good external evidence, and it has nothing to do with my being on the Gaither Committee, that the government did not have its eyes open in the summer and fall of 1957.

We did not make the basic reexaminations that should have been made. This is partly human nature because none of us like to re-examine too frequently or too profoundly things we take for granted in our own lives, and this certainly is true about people whether they are private citizens or members of the NSC.

That is why I think Mr. Bowie quite rightly says that the machinery has not always assured a realistic appraisal of conditions which run counter to strong preconceptions.

I would say we are not currently organized to see to it that conditions that run counter to strong preconceptions are kicked to the top and put on the top of the agenda.

Senator Jackson. Just to clarify an earlier colloquy, when the Gaither Committee was mentioned, I think my reply to a question from Mr. Pendleton might suggest that any reference to the Gaither Committee would be deleted. I think that under the guide lines we have worked out, we adhere to the principles laid down in the guide lines which, of course, forbids any reference to the substantive contents of the Gaither report.

That was covered by a letter of the President to Senator Johnson which I referred to in my earlier opening statement, but the only items that will be excised will be ones bearing on national security under the rules that apply, that is, the rules of security, and the specific provisions covered by the guide lines.

I just wanted to make clear that just the mere mention or reference to the Gaither Committee is not in itself a security matter. That is just to clarify the record.

Dr. Perkins. The fact is, the report has not been released and presumably this is not a procedure for detouring around that decision, and none of us want any part in any such detour.

Senator Jackson. We are not going to do it directly or indirectly, and the President has a constitutional right to have such communications treated as confidential, and otherwise he cannot do his job.

Dr. Perkins. Of course he does.

Senator Jackson. There is a real, valid reason for the constitutional principle.

Dr. Perkins. I might say, those of us on the Gaither Committee have become reasonably expert in dodging efforts to pry out of us what was in that report.

Senator Jackson. Now, if we may take up Mr. Bowie's points (3) and (4) together, if there is no objection --

Points (3) and (4) read as follows:

"(3) The machinery has not produced a balanced allocation of resources among essential activities. The Soviet challenge is many sided. It is not merely a military threat but also a political, diplomatic, and propaganda offensive throughout the world. The most obvious of these threats, however, is the military. Since it is easy to dramatize, there has been a dangerous tendency to emphasize military programs at the expense of other programs in allocating resources.

"The programs for economic and technical assistance and for reciprocal trade agreements have had much harder sledding: their results are more gradual and the threat is less dramatic. Yet failure to carry on a balanced program with necessary stress on non-military measures will expose us to grave danger of being slowly strangled and isolated even while maintaining an adequate military posture.

"Even the military field suffers from similar distorting factors. The capability for all-out retaliatory capacity, represented by SAC, enjoys widespread support. Yet that capability, while essential, is clearly not enough. The growing Soviet nuclear capacity has tended to erode the value of SAC as a deterrent to local aggression. To stop that hole in its defenses, the United States needs to create and maintain an adequate capacity for using force on a limited scale. Yet neither the Executive nor Congress has fully faced up to this need. Since lack of flexible military means could hamper our diplomacy and imperil our security, this defect could be extremely serious.

"(4) The Soviet offensive is essentially long-term. The Soviet leaders view 'competitive coexistence' as a struggle for an indefinite time. Even if peace is preserved they clearly intend to probe for weak spots and to exploit them fully by all other means. Our programs must also be planned and carried out on a long-term basis.

"For various reasons, our machinery is not well suited to planning and action in these terms. In the executive branch day-to-day crises constantly demand immediate action and divert attention from

analysis of more basic problems. The annual budget procedure also tends to shorten the focus within which programs are presented and judged.

"Again, with elections to Congress every two years, Members on the lookout for issues are likely to stress the short run. Finally, the press has a similar bias: the dramatic crisis is newsworthy; the gradual success seldom makes the headlines. All these factors tend to foreshorten the perspective in which programs are judged."

Now, would you comment on Mr. Bowie's point (3)?

Dr. Perkins. This is a judgment that one has to make, and Mr. Bowie has properly made it, as to the totality of our security program or our national security program. It has to do with a judgment about balance among the requirements for deterrence, limited war, civil defense, military assistance, foreign aid to various countries, that in his judgment apparently he feels that this system is out of balance.

I do, too. I think it is out of balance because with the understandable pressure to close this missile gap, too little attention has been given to the non-military components of a total defense posture.

In short, we might find that we have an absolutely invulnerable deterrent, and we might even find that we have an airlift system that meets our limited war requirements to the best possible reasonable measure. But then we could discover that the Soviets' real thrust was in the field of ideology and economics. If we have starved our information office, or have not appropriated enough funds for military assistance, we might be in the position of having locked the front door very well only to discover we had not even put up the screens in the back.

Now, insofar as this is true, and I am inclined to agree with Mr. Bowie that it is true, the place where our original machinery would be responsible is in giving undue weight to the military presentations when one is rounding out a balance between the factors I have just described.

I think this comes back to the fact that we mentioned in open testimony, that the civilians as bargainers in this complex thing called national security policy are not as well or as broadly prepared as their military counterparts.

The civilian in the Pentagon or the civilian in the State Department frequently does not have the full range of briefings, of training, and expertise as his military opposite number. Second, he does not

have the enormous advantage of what seems to be the more present danger.

Senator Jackson. Now, Mr. Bowie's fourth point that the Soviet offensive is essentially long term.

Dr. Perkins. Yes. On this one, this is an enormously complex matter and gets us into the matter of legislation and budgetary procedure. Also, it goes back to my familiar theme of the NSC becoming operational.

Insofar as the NSC is operational, it is dealing with matters that the operators currently have on their minds. Operators do not have long-term issues on their minds, because they are burdened with matters that they have to solve today. Then they take up tomorrow's problems when tomorrow comes.

So insofar as the NSC has become operational forward planning is likely to be foreshortened. Insofar as the NSC is advisory, its time consideration will be lengthened, and so I am back to my original thinking.

Now, the budgetary process reinforces the operational bias I have just described, because one is hardly through with a budget in this business before you have to deal with the next one.

I am told that most budgetary processes now, in government departments, involve working with three budgets simultaneously, deficiencies in the past one, the one you are working on, and the one that is coming up, and all of them involve hearings and operations that involve our operating officials.

This means that when you are dealing with an annual appropriation, from a lower House that has a two-year life, this very process restricts the range of possible planning, unless one goes in for a variety of devices that can lengthen this out.

So I would say that one of the places where American administrative ingenuity can be most profitably exercised would be evolving a system that has five and ten year lead times, that permits planning projections that do not get chewed to bits by annual budgetary cycles.

In short, I think the budgetary process supports a tendency on the part of operators to think in terms of daily crises. To that extent, I would agree with Bowie, that the budgetary business has interfered with long-range planning.

Senator Jackson. May I just at that point read this brief statement from Mr. Lovett's testimony before this committee on February 23, regarding a longer budget system, and I quote:

"I think that in any experimental development program involving research and the awkward period during translation of research into an actual item, funding it for one year is unrealistic. I think we need to have something longer in order not to have to reset sights and suffer the vacillation which ensues.

"One of the most painful things that an executive goes through in the Government departments is the change of program while you are right in the middle of it. You lose momentum and you delay the output. So I would say we need some form of budgeting for certainly half of the period of gestation of any new weapon, which used to be in the order of 5, 6 or 7 years -- about 5 years to take the low side.

"That would mean, say, 2 to 3 years of funding for some approved experimental research and development purpose. That would be the first area."

Dr. Perkins, I would say "amen" to that.

Senator Jackson. You concur in that?

Dr. Perkins. Yes, and there is a second point about budgeting that gets us into the NSC. We have made the point about the impact of fixed ceilings, and its impact on security planning. But there is a widely held view, as you well know, in the operating departments that the budget officers carry too much weight, and that the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and the Treasury Secretary in the NSC carries too much weight.

I would like to speak to both sides of that issue, if I may, because there are two sides: One, I think that people who talk about the budgetary tool as being one that the President should not use are talking sheer nonsense. The budget system and the budgetary tool is an indispensable tool of management and control, and of checking up on what you have, and seeing to it that there is some connection between costs and performance.

So those who are concerned about the role of the Bureau of the Budget, I think, are either wrong or they are misplacing their concern. If you are dissatisfied with either budgetary ceilings or with the views of budgetary officers, you should lodge your complaint with the people who use it, and not with the tool.

I think here we deal with a much more complicated issue. It is my general view, Senator, that the idea of the budgetary ceiling has been used as a short-cut means of dealing with a very tough problem of making a choice between complicated weapons systems.

Now, in short, I think, therefore, that while the complaint that the budgetary tool is inappropriate is wrong, I think a case can be made that the substitution of budget procedures for substantive decisions is equally wrong.

Senator Jackson. That goes to a very good point, and I think anyone who is realistically informed about the operation of government realizes that the budget tool can be a very useful tool when properly directed and operating from policy decisions that have been thoroughly considered, and thoroughly debated, and that meet overall requirements.

Would you agree with that?

Dr. Perkins. Yes, I would.

Senator Jackson. Do you have any further comments?

Dr. Perkins. No; I do not.

Senator Jackson. I shall ask the minority counsel, Mr. Pendleton, if he wishes to ask any questions. Mr. Pendleton?

Mr. Pendleton. Dr. Perkins, you mentioned at the beginning of your statement in this executive hearing that, prior to the session, you had spoken to the staff of this committee and Mr. Haskins. I was wondering whether you had prior to this session spoken either to Senator Mundt or Senator Javits or to me?

Dr. Perkins. No, sir.

Mr. Pendleton. Throughout this discussion in executive session you have referred to the President. Do you mean by "the President" any particular occupant of that position?

Dr. Perkins. I was talking about the Presidency.

Mr. Pendleton. And not the present incumbent in particular?

Dr. Perkins. No, sir.

Mr. Pendleton. In discussing the operations of the National Security Council, would you state the basis of your knowledge of the operations of that council?

Dr. Perkins. My first contact came as in the Pentagon, when I was first consultant and then deputy chairman of the Research and Development Board. In order to discharge my responsibilities, I was given a whole series of National Security Council papers that bore on the dimensions of the responsibilities of the Department of Defense.

I must have read about 25, I would guess, such papers and amendments thereto.

So there was a period when I was thoroughly familiar with not only the papers, but the procedure by which those papers were developed and of the development of papers in the Pentagon for the Security Council.

My second large exposure came through the Gaither Committee and I will not say any more than that for fear of getting into trouble. There may have been an NSC paper that bore on our security program that I did not see during the summer, but I do not know what it was. I had a chance to see both the Planning Board and the Security Council itself in operation, but more importantly, I had a chance to discuss, since we were very much interested in finding out how our report could be of most use to the Security Council, how the thing worked.

Of course, there is a good deal in public print about the Security Council. Fortunately, a good bit of it has now been put together in your very excellent committee document entitled "Selected Materials," but before that I had a chance to read Mr. Cutler's statement about how the Council operates, and Mr. Gray's statement when they appeared in Foreign Affairs magazine.

Mr. Pendleton. And Doctor, in the course of your experience, have you attended meetings of the NSC?

Dr. Perkins. One.

Mr. Pendleton. You referred to a question of the discussion between the people participating in the operations of the National Security Council, and the question came there.

Dr. Perkins. Will you repeat that again?

Mr. Pendleton. You referred in your discussions to the participation between the attendants at NSC meetings. The question arose in my mind on the opportunity for the operating heads of the agencies to discuss policy versus the presentation of a compromise decision at the NSC level.

I believe your statement was in regard to the presentation of a compromise rather than the opportunity for the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State and other members of the NSC to discuss the issue.

Do you believe that it would be more advisable for policy recommendations to be made by other people than the heads of the operating agencies?

Dr. Perkins. That is a very good question, and a very complicated one, and it requires a complicated answer.

There is a wide division of opinion, as you know, about such matters. There is one school of thought that says you ought to have a series of senior officers, with no operating responsibility. There is another that says that you get your best advice from those who are in the middle of operations.

I am with the latter school. I think that you do get your best advice from people who have large operating responsibilities; at least you have a chance to make sure that you are getting the benefit of advice that comes out of considerable experience. The man who does not have any such connection has an important role, but not the continuing role that I would expect from, let us say, the Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary of State.

I would say, then, if I were the person who had to lean on advice, I would certainly want to seek it on a continuing basis, from the people who had the large operational responsibilities in government. In that sense I think that the statutory membership, or those who are invited, at least some of them, represent on the average where you get your best advice.

No system is perfect, and no operator is ever one who is always the best possible administrator, and the freest and most creative thinker. So I think a person, when he looks over the people who are giving him advice, has to make shrewd judgments about each individual. Is this man really in addition to his large operating responsibilities also likely to be the most creative?

You know as well as I do that lots of times you answer differently depending upon the person. Now, a wise man who uses an advisory group will assess the capabilities of each of the persons who are immediately around him, and will decide where there are some deficiencies in his advisory system.

So my conclusion about this would be that a President, and I am not talking about any particular President, would do well to see to it that if he does not have the creative, imaginative advice that he needs, as well as the stable operational capability, from those who come to NSC affairs, he ought to invite into it not people who have other operating responsibilities necessarily, but maybe he has a staff assistant, and maybe the imagination comes in an Under Secretary some place, or maybe it comes from some other part of the government, and maybe he has to get it from outside expert committees.

But he cannot afford, having made a survey of the kind of capabilities he has in his NSC membership, he cannot afford to pass

up the chance for getting creative, fresh, courageous advice into his system.

Mr. Pendleton. That raises the next question, of course, and it involves the difficulty of getting both points of view, and that is the number of people who attend.

I believe at the present time among the 20 or so that attend the NSC, there is George Kistiakowsky, the President's Science Adviser. Do you believe it is better for him to be there, or does his presence and some of these other outside people create a mass atmosphere?

Dr. Perkins. Well, is he going to appear before this committee?

Senator Jackson. He will not appear, because of his position in the White House.

Dr. Perkins. I think that I could not answer that without knowing Kistiakowsky better than I do. I know about him and I have met him.

Mr. Pendleton. Any science adviser. I meant just anyone.

Dr. Perkins. That is all right. I think there would be many times when if I were a President I would like to have a science adviser present when certain topics were up. I would not want him to feel that he was there because he had to register a point of view on all the matters on the agenda.

Mr. Pendleton. Now, to close, to turn to Mr. Bowie's statements on page 105, the first question there in regard to the policy-making problem--do you believe that the United States in its foreign policy-making should or should not consult with its allies and with the Congress?

Dr. Perkins. Of course it has to. The one way in which you develop a consensus in a democracy is by dealing not only with your legislature, but with other private organizations whose knowledge and know-how about what the government is doing is imperative.

I would also take it that we are the leaders of the Western alliance structure. For us not to consult our allies would be sheer murder. Bowie, of course, is perfectly correct in saying that we have to consult Congress, and the allies, and different parts of the government.

Mr. Pendleton. And then the final point is point number 2 there, in regard to the procedure of NSC on existing papers and policy. I would like to refer you to page 55 of "Organizing for National Security:

Selected Materials," where Mr. Cutler discussed this, and I am sure you have seen that. The fourth paragraph there says:

> "moving farther along the spectrum, we find the continuing review of all policies, including those approved by President Eisenhower. A national security policy is not created to be put in a glass museum case. As world events shift or take on new emphasis under more recent intelligence reports, there is need to subject policies to a fresh look. Periodically the Operations Coordinating Board reports to the Council on departmental and agency progress in carrying out currently operative national security policies, on its judgment of the adequacy or failings of such policies."

In the light of that statement, do you feel there is a continuing review of existing policy?

Dr. Perkins. Mr. Cutler says there was during his time, and then there sure was, because he is a man of enormous integrity, and I would have no basis for quarreling with what he says. I would register a caveat, however, which is that policies that get reduced to paper and countersigned by a lot of people are harder to modify than ones that have not gone through some kind of paper validation process.

But I would say that Cutler is obviously right, that there is a system for review, and I just hope that the barrier I have described is one that he finds easy to surmount.

Mr. Pendleton. You referred to Mr. Cutler's time. So far as you have personal knowledge, is there any change in that procedure at the present time?

Dr. Perkins. I have no way of knowing. I have no reason to believe it has changed.

Mr. Pendleton. Thank you.

Senator Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Pendleton.

Well, Dr. Perkins, as I indicated in the open session, your testimony has been most informative, and it has been constructive. I can add that your testimony in connection with the NSC that we have taken here in executive session has been very thoughtful. I know you have spent a lot of time on this particular area of government machinery. I do want to commend you for it.

Dr. Perkins. Thank you, Senator. I have enjoyed being here, and if I have been of any help I am most pleased.

Senator Jackson. The committee will stand adjourned until ten o'clock tomorrow morning when we will resume our open sessions.

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